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The aim of this paper is to emphasize how the correlations between public resources 
flows and their allocations are manifesting. The results obtained suggest the existence 
of some “fast” adjustment processes between them, inducted by the intrinsic 
characteristics of the fiscal policy, and also by the specific behaviour of Romanian 





1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The implementation of the fiscal policy, as a sine qua non condition, suppose that some 
structural-functional correlations between the resources mobilised by the different 
levels of public administration and their assignment to be met. The configuration of 
these correlations derives from the nature of economical restrictions on the one hand 
and from the implicit utility function of these authorities in the other hand. In another 
way, the decisions to collect and to allocate the public resources are based, on the one 
hand, on the restrictions inducted by the volume and structure of the resources that can 
be collected and by the quality of allocation and reallocation mechanism, and, on the 
other hand, by the social and political objectives assumed by the public decision-
makers. 
 
For emergent economic systems, that are facing a deep reconfiguration of functional 
and institutional structure, and a redefinition of the social objectives, these correlations   12
receive specific particularities. The list of the factors that determine these particularities 
is the following, in a minimal manner: 
−  restrictions in the supply side; 
−  imperfections of the financial resources collection and allocation mechanism; 
−  the incipient state of institutional infrastructure; 
−  imperfect and asymmetric information for different social actors; 
−  uncertainty in public decision process that stimulates a behaviour from public 
decision-makers that is opportunistic and time inconsistent.   
 
The main components of the fiscal policy, the formation and allocation of the public 
resources, and the correlations between them have been actively studied in the last 
decades. Important contributions were made by Blachard (1985), Barro (1989) and 
Emerson et al. (1992). Also, concerning the research on dynamic equilibrium of public 
revenues and expenditures, focusing on the role of fiscal policy regarding public deficit 
and public debt, important contribution had Turnovski (1993) and Amador (1999). 
 
 
2.  THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTS 
 
The analysis of de facto correlations between revenues flows and expenditures flows at 
the superior level of public administration presumes, as it comes also from the previous 
remarks on different conceptual approaches, the identification of the implicit form of 
the utility function that is relevant for this level of administration. 
 
It must to remark that this identification has, usually, an ex-post nature. So, it is very 
difficult to make an ex-ante setting-up. For sure, the existence of some formal 
objectives for the public administration makes possible the statement of some 
hypothesis, which gives us the possibility to estimate the form of the utility function for 
public decision-makers. A critical aspect is represented by the credibility of the 
informational signal that is transmitted by the public decision-makers, especially for an 
economic system still in transition that generates the mentioned time inconsistency of 
the public policy. More, the state of economic development, the limited number of 
public resources sources and the imperfection of the allocation mechanisms imposes 
frequent restatements of public decisions which influences public revenues and public 
expenditures flows. 
 
So, the dynamic of the revenues and expenditures could present significant up and 
downs for the evolution pattern. “The capacity of reaction” of the public authorities in 
modifying the economic and social conjuncture is limited by the imperfection of both 
institutions and mechanisms involved in public decision-making process. So, we could 
presume the existence of some inertial behaviors in the budget parameters evolution. 
To emphasize these contrary tendencies, it is necessary to select an analytical 
framework able to reflect the autoregressive character of revenues and expenditures 
flows and the manifestation of uncorrelated shocks at their level. This framework 
should also emphasize the bi-univocal connections between revenues and expenditures.   
 
This analytical framework could be presented in this manner (figure 1):  
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As this framework shows, subsidiary factors of public decision direct to the 
configuration of revenues and expenditures’ current and previous  levels. More, the 
levels of these variables from previous periods are influencing the current ones, and the 
shocks occurred are affecting in a non-linear way the dynamic of the current budgetary 
parameters. The exact configuration of the public revenues flows and their allocation 
derives from the combination of the inertial effects and the multiplicative shocks. It 
must also be remarked that because public financial flows are just partially self-
determined, the structural-functional changes in the economic system as a whole have a 
significant contribution. So, because transition economic systems are in a deep 
transformation, the level of economic activity output could be very fluctuant, which 
tends to lower the gathering base of public resources that can be mobilised by the 
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3.  METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
A useful framework for presenting and testing the described connections is represented 
by VAR models (Vector Autoregressive Model), which allow us to analyse the dynamic 
of inter-correlated time series and to reveal the stochastic shocks at the level of 
considered variables. The general form of endogen variables vector for a model of this 
type is: 
 
[ ] ) 1 ( v ch Y t t t =  
 
where ch, v represent the variations in the level of public expenditures and revenues in 
the current period t, variations that can be expressed as: 
 
















For presenting how such a model can be applied in approaching the inter-connections 
between public revenues and their allocation, in an instable economic system, as in 
Romania, we propose an analysis made for January 1997 – December 2003 period, 




Data that we used represent monthly, un-cumulated values of collected public revenues 
and carried out public expenditures, from the Annual budgetary execution account, 
in constant prices. For eliminating the effects of the specific seasonality of public 
resources collection and allocation, original data was de-seasonalised using X12-
ARIMA procedure. 
 
The sources of data are represented by the 2002 Annual Report of Romanian 
National Bank and the 2003 Monthly Bulletins of the central bank.  
The analysis period is limited at the specified range because of inadequate available 
data and for assuring their homogeneity. 
 
Static characteristics analysis 
Analysing budgetary parameters characteristics for the period January 1997 – 
December 2003, we can state the following 
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The stationarity tests indicates that revenues and expenditures variations could be, in a 
suitable way, treated as a I(0) process:  ( ) 0 I : 
I. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test  
Revenues 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -10.37903   0.0001 
Test's critical values:  1%     -3.513344   
 5%      -2.897678   
 10%      -2.586103   
* MacKinnon critical values (1996)  
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Expenditures 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -9.744937   0.0000 
Test's critical values:  1%     -3.513344  
 5%      -2.897678  
 10%      -2.586103  
* MacKinnon critical values (1996)  
II. Phillips-Peron test 
Venituri 
       t-Stat ajustat    Prob.* 
Phillips-Perron test statistic  -20.84953   0.0001 
Test's critical values:  1%     -3.512290   
 5%      -2.897223   
 10%      -2.585861   
* MacKinnon critical values (1996) 
Cheltuieli 
       t-Stat ajustat    Prob.* 
Phillips-Perron test statistic  -21.66177   0.0001 
Test's critical values:  1%     -3.512290   
 5%      -2.897223   
 10%      -2.585861   
* MacKinnon critical values (1996) 
 
c) Co-integration relations 
Johansen co-integration test leads to following conclusions (the test was made by 
assuming the hypothesis of a deterministic and restricted constant trend): 
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test 




Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical value  Critical value 
Any **   0.336795   48.90608   19.96   24.60 
At most one **   0.201063   17.28444    9.24   12.97 
 *(**) Denotes the rejection of the hypothesis for a 5% (1%) threshold 
The Trace test point to the existence of 2 co-integration relations 




Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical value  Critical value 
Any **   0.336795   31.62164   15.67   20.20 
At most one **   0.201063   17.28444    9.24   12.97 
 *(**) Denotes the rejection of the hypothesis for a 5% (1%) threshold 
 The Max test point to the existence of 2 co-integration relations for a 5% threshold and 
also for a 1% threshold.   17
Estimating the coefficients and the quality of the model 
A) Coefficients 
The estimation of the general model parameters described by the relation (1), in its 
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  [ 2.88709]  [ 2.46389] 
2 R    0.365003   0.402928 
adjusted
2 R    0.292432   0.334692 
F-statistic   5.029602   5.904857 
Probability function (log)  -328.4934  -342.8068 
AKAIKE informational criterion  8.544137   8.906502 
SCHWARZ informational 
criterion 
 8.814074   9.176439 
 AKAIKE informational criterion   17.39952 
 SCHWARZ informational criterion    17.93940 
B) Residuals analysis 
Portmanteau autocorrelation test for residual variables for this model leads to 
following results: 
Lags Q-Stat Prob.  Adj  Q-Stat  Prob.  df 
1   0.283000  NA*   0.286628  NA*  NA* 
2   0.827977  NA*   0.845760  NA*  NA* 
3   3.652043  NA*   3.781303  NA*  NA* 
4   5.880512  NA*   6.128623  NA*  NA* 
5   7.545110   0.1097   7.905694   0.0951  4 
6   11.03746   0.1996   11.68509   0.1658  8 
7   15.00347   0.2412   16.03668   0.1896  12 
8   23.94956   0.0906   25.99078   0.0542  16 
9   25.77310   0.1734   28.04877   0.1082  20 
10   27.20681   0.2949   29.69027   0.1952  24 
11   31.49510   0.2955   34.67226   0.1796  28 
12   36.51204   0.2670   40.58776   0.1419  32 
Note: the test is valid only for lags bigger then number of lags considered in the VAR 
model.df  represents the number of degrees of freedom for asymptotic distribution 
2 χ  
statistic (calculated). 
These values allow us to reject the self-correlation between residual values. But: 
Null hypothesis – residual variables are (multivaried) normal: 
Component Skewness  2 χ   df Prob. 
1  -1.858006   45.45380  1   0.0000 
2  -0.843460   9.367092  1   0.0022 
Common     54.82089  2   0.0000 
      
Component  Kurtosis  2 χ   df Prob. 
1   11.06188   213.9384  1   0.0000 
2   5.022216   13.46080  1   0.0002 
Common     227.3992  2   0.0000 
Component  Jarque-Bera  2 χ   Prob.    19
      
1   259.3922  2   0.0000   
2   22.82789  2   0.0000   
   259.3922  2   0.0000   
Common   282.2201  4   0.0000   
      
It could be observed that the hypothesis of residual variables non-normal distribution 
can’t be rejected in a satisfying way. 
 
The model includes characteristic roots that are, in the modulus, inferior to unity (the 
biggest of them is equal to 0.775), allowing the limitation of negative effects on the 
model stability thanks to superior order integration. At last, the “weak” exogenity 
hypothesis could be rejected for each of the two variables. 
 
Expenditure-revenues impulse function 
Based on these results we could consider that this model satisfactory describes the 
connection between implicated variables. Its use allow us to make an approximation of 
the impulse function form, which estimates the public expenditures evolution caused 
by a shock in the revenues level. (the model of generalised impulses for decomposing 
the factors – chart 1): 
 





















4.  DISCUSSIONS 
 
As the impulse function shows, a shock in the public revenues determines a more than 
proportional time correlated growth in expenditures level, followed in a two period 
interval by a “down” adjustment, and after that inducted effects are “fainting” in a two   20
quarters period. In our opinion, the described situation reflects an “over-reaction” of 
public authorities, and an attempt to restore initial budgetary parameters. 
 
It is important to remark that the ensemble of these effects is “short-termed”, reaching 
maximal levels in first post-impact quarter. In other words, changes in the 
configuration of public decision mentioned determinants are fast and instable 
rebounded upon the dynamic of revenues and expenditures flows, determining frequent 
inter-correlated adjustment. 
 
The uni(bi)-periodical character of the disturbance effects suffered by the mobilised 
resources by the fiscal authority on the allocation mechanisms could be envisaged 
analysing the contribution of these disturbances to stress the volatility of public 
expenditures (table 1): 
 
Table 1 Decomposing public expenditures variance (%) 
 




1  16.43942 100.0000 0.000000 
2  19.94404 98.23887 1.761133 
3  20.11704 96.60440 3.395601 
4  20.12922 96.54319 3.456811 
5  20.17362 96.28753 3.712465 
6  20.51308 94.95766 5.042338 
7  20.56513 94.88896 5.111038 
8  20.57013 94.88324 5.116762 
9  20.57092 94.88287 5.117126 
10  20.58645 94.83898 5.161019 
11  20.60418 94.79893 5.201071 
12  20.60649 94.79722 5.202779 
Note: Cholesky factors decomposition 
 
It could be observed that the “peak” of the effects inducted by an impulse of public 
revenues on expenditures volatility is reached in about two quarters, without any 
significant changes to appear later, and that the ampleness of this “peak” is relatively 
limited. 
 
We consider that these results envisage relatively clearly the mentioned inertial 
reactions and multiplicative shocks combination which characterizes adaptive 
processes appeared at the public resources flows level. 
 
We insist that these results should be interpreted with care, on the one hand because the 
insufficient data volume, and on the other hand because the structural and functional 
changes of the economic system, institutions, instruments and fiscal policy mechanisms 
in analysed period. 
   21
More, even that the used VAR model can be described, in a satisfying way, as a 
“stable” model, it is obvious that its viability could be considered just a “short-term” 
one, in which adjustment processes at the implied variables level are incomplete. 
 
It is necessary to mention some imperfections of the adopted conceptual framework. 
So, it is critically that a set of public decision determinants is mentioned, without any 
formal description of the way that they lead to the manifestation of the mentioned 
“over-reaction”. 
 
It is possible to state that “institutional imperfections”, “opportunistic change of public 
decision-makers utility function”, “credibility” or “structural shocks” are, intuitively, 
factors of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, and in this case,  “over-reactions” are, more or 
less, inherent. But, this kind of approach don’t give an unquestionable proof for de 
facto existence of this sort of fiscal policy.  
 
Despite of these limitations, we consider that the image derived from the use of the 
proposed model is a realistic one and this model is able to catch some essential features 
of the way in which the fiscal policy react at changes in hypothesis, in an economic 




5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis presented in this paper had in mind to envisage the way of manifestation 
of the correlation between public resources and their allocation. 
 
Results obtained suggest the existence of some “fast” adjustment processes inducted by 
the intrinsic characteristics of the fiscal policy, and by the specific behaviour of the 
public authorities, particularities that are active in adoption and application of the 
public decision. 
 
The main analytical development directions are: 
•  Widening of conceptual framework taken into consideration explicitly 
determinant factors of correlation between public revenues and public 
expenditures; 
•  Adoption of some alternative methodologies for empirical testing of these 
determinants way of manifestation; 
•  Taking into consideration the case of another emerging economic systems< 
Simulating the implications resulted for the way of conception and application of 
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